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 1 
Abstract 
Scholarly research on the executive usurpation of legislative power often focuses on 
Presidents and executive branch officials acting beyond their statutory authority through 
executive action. I believe it is likewise important, however, to address how Presidents 
have acted unconstitutionally through the under-enforcement of policies. In this paper, I 
investigate and analyze the encroachment on legislative power through executive refusal 
to defend, enforce, or implement the law, with specific focus on the presidency of Donald 
Trump. The Take-Care Clause is recognized as a guard against the suspension and 
dispensation of Congressional Acts by requiring the President to execute all 
constitutionally valid Acts of Congress. However, there continues to be deliberate 
decisions taken by Presidents either to not enforce or selectively under-enforce laws to 
further a political agenda; the Controlled Substances Act and the Immigration and 
Naturalization Act represent two such case studies which I will explore in detail. 
  
 2 
Introduction 
 
The President shall “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” 
 - Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution  
 
The words above are often referred to as the “Take-Care Clause,” and serve as the 
guiding force behind executive power. They reflect some of the American legal system’s 
oldest roots in English common law, where structure is derived from a long history of 
customary and judicial precedents instead of a codified constitution or written bill of 
rights. It is undeniable that the Framers’ own experiences with their British rulers 
influenced and shaped their perception of executive power; much like other parts of the 
US Constitution, Article II Section 3 exemplifies this by being derived from the “long 
struggle between Parliament and the Crown over the extent of prerogative powers—that 
is, the monarch’s asserted powers to create laws or otherwise to act unilaterally.”1 When 
constructing the US Constitution, the Framers reflected on English fear and sentiment 
against an absolute monarchy, and allocated executive power in a way that expressed a 
similar concern; this inspired a dramatically stripped down vision of America’s 
executive, where many of the powers formerly held by the King were either instead 
transferred to Congress or explicitly prohibited to the President.2 
But what does a faithful execution of the law consist of, and what would 
characterize a violation of this provision? This is the question I seek to explore in this 
                                               
1 Michael McConnell, “Obama’s Unconstitutional Immigration Order,” The Hoover Institution, 
13 April 2016, at www.hoover.org/research/obamas-unconstitutional-immigration-order. 
2 Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 American University Law Review 259, 
(2009).  
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paper. Let me begin by emphasizing what I am not talking about: the exercise of powers 
improperly delegated by Congress3 or a proactive executive action in which the President 
undertakes some policy prohibited to him or her by the Constitution, such as the 
unilateral bombing of Syria,4 an act of war, without a Declaration of War from 
Congress.5 Executive non-enforcement, although often overlooked, plays a crucial and 
highly impactful role in the expansion the executive office; if left unchecked, it can grow 
to introduce a significant imbalance to the separation of powers framework. In the words 
of one presidential scholar, allowing Presidents the unrestricted enforcement discretion 
that nonenforcement due to policy reasons would entail, could be providing “Presidents 
with a sort of second veto, an authority to remake the law on the ground without asking 
Congress to revise the law on the books.”6  
 In this essay, I will delve deeper into this unconstitutional act, first by examining 
the origins of the Take-Care Clause in English history through its involvement in the 
construction of the US Constitution to help establish the original understanding of 
executive enforcement obligations. I then will present several examples of executive non-
action under the presidency of Barack Obama that have stood in direct violation of the 
text and original meaning of Article II, Section 3 of the US Constitution. Lastly, I 
examine Donald Trump’s presidency; while his administration has taken some steps 
towards the enforcement of previously ignored Congressional Acts, their future execution 
                                               
3 Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful, (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2014).  
4 Charlie Savage, “Was Trump’s Syria Strike Illegal? Explaining Presidential War Powers,” The 
New York Times, 7 April 2017, at www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/military-force-
presidential-power.html.  
5 Louis Fisher, Presidential War Power Third Edition, Revised, (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansa, 2013). 
6 Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 Vanderbilt Law Review 671, 
(2014), at 674. 
 4 
is largely uncertain. I believe this integral step toward defending our modern 
governmental structure involves analyzing not only aspects of Donald Trump’s 
presidency that have violated the Constitution, but also actions that take potential steps 
towards being in accordance with its text. Such an analysis will bring a more realistic 
critique beyond just where our government stands, and lay the groundwork to propose 
appropriate steps toward where we would like it to go.  
 5 
Part 1: The Origin Against the Power to Suspend and Dispense Law 
1.1 The Stuart Kings and The English Monarchy 
 
“The law of England is divided into three parts, common law, statute law, and custom; 
but the King’s proclamation is none of them.”  
- Sir Edward Coke 
 
The powers and duties granted to the executive under the US Constitution were 
largely influenced and framed by the colonists’ perspective and reflection on the English 
monarchy, and the Take-Care Clause within the US Constitution is no exception. The 
colonists were reacting to the King's arbitrary suspension of parliamentary statutes after 
reading and analyzing the works of British thinkers and scholars that spoke of the horrors 
and against the ever expansive prerogative powers of the King.7 These powers enabled 
monarchs to create laws or otherwise to act unilaterally, often in direct contradiction to 
the statutes enacted by Parliament.  
It is important to note that the English monarch, as described by Montesquieu, 
could be more appropriately categorized in behavior as a republic, “disguised under the 
form of monarchy.”8 Even under a monarchical system, the English highly valued the 
principle of common law, or that law exists in the hearts and minds of people and is 
manifested in both statute and precedential court decisions.9 However, after the Stuarts 
                                               
7 E. S. Creasy, The Rise and Progress of the English Constitution, (New York: D. Appleton And 
Company, 1853). 
8 Baron de Montesquieu, Spirits of the Laws, Thomas Nugent trans., (New York: Hafner 
Publishing Company, 1949). 
9 “Common Law,” Oxford University Press, found at 
en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/common_law. 
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Kings took to the throne, they made numerous efforts to expand royal prerogatives, 
infuriating Parliament and the English people alike. It was, in the words of law professor 
Michael McConnell, this struggle between “parliamentarians and judges to curtail the 
powers of an oftentimes arbitrary and grasping royal monarch that became transposed not 
only in the English Bill of Right, but also in the US Constitution.”10  
James I, the first Stuart monarch, was of Scottish origin. When James I claimed 
the throne of England in 1603, his rule was inevitably influenced by his reign as King in 
Scotland, holding a very clearly defined idea of what the monarchy should look like; he 
believe that he was only accountable to God, never to man or law.11 It should thus come 
at no surprise that he had great difficulty understanding the principle of common law and 
became infuriated by the limits on his power. During his reign, he tried expanding royal 
prerogative with a number of unsuccessful acts, such as “prohibiting new buildings in and 
around London and the making of starch of wheat.”12 James I’s son, Charles I, continued 
these efforts to expand royal prerogatives and unilateral lawmaking after his father’s 
death, going as far as forcing his subjects to make loans to the crown and expanding 
taxation without Parliament’s approval.13 However such expansive powers did not go 
unchallenged; in 1640, Parliament attempted to restrain the Stuart Kings’ abuses of royal 
prerogatives with the Petition of Right. It stated that:  
                                               
10 Michael McConnell, “Obama’s Unconstitutional Immigration Order,” The Hoover Institution, 
13 April 2016, at www.hoover.org/research/obamas-unconstitutional-immigration-order. 
11  Pauline Croft, King James, ( New York: Palgrave, 2003). The Political Works of James I: 
Reprinted from the Edition of 1616, Charles Howard McIlwain, ed., (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1918). 
12 Philip Hamburger, Law and Judicial Duty,  ( Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), at 
201. 
13 Arthur J. Cockfield and Jonah Mayles, The Influence of Historical Tax Law Developments on 
Anglo-American Laws and Politics, 5 Columbia Journal of Tax Law, (2013), at 53-55. 
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“... [the King’s] subjects have inherited this freedom, that they should not be 
compelled to contribute to any tax, tallage, aid, or other like charge not set by 
common consent, in parliament… the statute called 'The Great Charter of the 
Liberties of England' declared and enacted, that no freeman may be taken or 
imprisoned or be disseized of his freehold or liberties, or his free customs, or be 
outlawed or exiled, or in any manner destroyed, but by the lawful judgment of his 
peers, or by the law of the land. And in the eight-and-twentieth year of the reign 
of King Edward III, it was declared and enacted by authority of parliament, that 
no man, of what estate or condition that he be, should be put out of his land or 
tenements, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited nor put to death without 
being brought to answer by due process of law.”14 
The Petition of Right then concludes:  
 “All which they most humbly pray of your most excellent Majesty as their rights 
and liberties, according to the laws and statutes of this realm; and that your 
Majesty would also vouchsafe to declare, that the awards, doings, and 
proceedings, to the prejudice of your people in any of the premises, shall not be 
drawn hereafter into consequence or example; and that your Majesty would be 
also graciously pleased, for the further comfort and safety of your people, to 
declare your royal will and pleasure, that in the things aforesaid all your officers 
and ministers shall serve you according to the laws and statutes of this realm, as 
they tender the honor of your Majesty, and the prosperity of this kingdom.”15 
                                               
14 Petition of Right (1627), reprinted in W. McElreath, at 196-99. 
15 Ibid. 
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While the Petition of Right aimed to prohibit a number of the most contentious unilateral 
abuses of royal prerogatives, it saw little success in practice; the Stuart Kings continued 
their abuses largely undeterred, further raising tensions between the monarchy and the 
Parliament. 16  
Much like his predecessors, Charles II acted in ways that greatly expanded the 
royal prerogative and angered Parliament. For example, in his Declaration of Indulgence 
of 1672, Charles II attempted to use those prerogatives to suspend statutes penalizing 
Catholics,17 stating that:  
“We do in the next place declare our will and pleasure to be, that the execution of 
all, and all manner of penal laws in matters ecclesiastical, against whatsoever 
sort of nonconformists, or recusants, be immediately suspended, and they are 
hereby suspended; and all judges, judges of assize and gaol delivery, sheriffs, 
justices of the peace, mayors, bailiffs, and other officers whatsoever, whether 
ecclesiastical or civil, are to take notice of it and pay due obedience thereunto.”18  
The result was an enraged Parliament who reasserted their power by rescinding the 
Declaration, and in its place enacting the Test Act of 1673.19 The Test Act “required all 
persons holding any public office to take an oath declaring a belief against 
transubstantiation in Holy Communion and to receive the sacrament according to the rites 
                                               
16 Linda Levy Peck, Court Patronage and Corruption in Early Stuart England, (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman Ltd, 1990).  
17A. M. Chambers, A Constitutional History of England, (New York: The MacMillan Company, 
1909), at 332.  
18 R. Tudur Jones, Arthur Long, and Rosemary Moore, ed., Protestant Nonconformist Texts 
Volume 1: 1550 - 1700, Volume 1, (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2007), at 260. 
19 Ronald H. Fritze, William B. Robison, and William Robison, Historical Dictionary of Stuart 
England, 1603-1689, (WestPort: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), at 252. 
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of the Church of England within three months of admittance to office.”20 However 
following Charles II’s death in 1685, his brother James II assumed the throne with an 
agenda that would target and attack the Test Act.21 Critical parliamentarians claimed 
James II had one goal, the restoration of Catholicism as the established religion, and to 
accomplish this issued a Declaration of Indulgence that suspended the “ecclesiastical 
laws.”22 He also granted dispensations from the Test Act to a large number of Catholics, 
allowing them to hold public office despite the act explicitly only granting that right to 
conformist Protestants.23 He decreed:  
“We do likewise declare, that it is our royal will and pleasure, that from 
henceforth the execution of all and all manner of penal laws in matters 
ecclesiastical, for not coming to church, or not receiving the Sacrament, or for 
any other nonconformity to the religion established, or for or by reason of the 
exercise of religion in any manner whatsoever, be immediately suspended; and 
the further execution of the said penal laws and every of them is hereby 
suspended.24 
It is important to note that England, prior to the reign of James II, did not find 
problem with the power to dispense with a law: the granting of a royal warrant exempting 
                                               
20 Byron York, The No Religious Test Clause, 120 Harvard Law Review 1649, (2007), at 1651. 
21 Ronald H. Fritze, William B. Robison, and William Robison, Historical Dictionary of Stuart 
England, 1603-1689, (WestPort: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), at 252-254. 
22 James A. Reichley, Religion in American Public Life, (Washington DC: The Brooking 
Institution, 1985), at 77. 
23 Ronald H. Fritze, William B. Robison, William Robison, Historical Dictionary of Stuart 
England, 1603-1689, (WestPort: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1996), at 253. 
24 Andrew Browning, ed., English Historical Documents, 1660-1714, (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1953), at 399-400. 
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certain persons from ‘the Obligation of a Law’.25 Parliaments had historically met 
infrequently and were consequently inexperienced when drafting law, so in practice these 
powers equipped the monarch the with the capability to react to emerging conditions and 
worked in line with the Parliaments’ interests.26 However, this changed with the actions 
of James II, which went beyond the mere dispensation of the law by making lawful what 
statutory law had previously declared unlawful; as historian Dennis Dixon explained, 
James II “used [his power] to systematically dispense with a vast array of religious 
legislation and rules governing the universities. There was no ‘emerging inconvenience’ 
to justify the use of the power. . . .”27 His actions led to Godden v. Hales, a court case that 
tried the King’s use dispensing power.28 And although King James II was found not 
guilty by the court, the social and political climate became particularly hostile towards 
the King and his rule; disapproval and discontent grew, and with it so did a public feeling 
to overthrow him.29 King James II’s broad use of power would end up transforming 
England for years to come; no other English monarch would attempt to expand their 
prerogative powers by suspension and dispensation of law. 
1.2 William of Orange and the Glorious Revolution 
William of Orange, a Dutch and Protestant son-in-law to James II, was urged 
through a letter signed by seven prominent politicians on June 30, 1688 to claim the 
                                               
25 Carolyn A. Edie, Tactics and Strategies: Parliament’s Attack Upon the Royal Dispensing 
Power 1597-1689, 29 The American Journal of Legal History 197, (Oxford University Press, 
1985). 
26 Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 Texas 
Law Review 781, (2013), at 805. 
27 Dennis Dixon, Godden v Hales revisited – James II and the dispensing power, 27 The Journal 
of Legal History 129, (2006).  
28 Ibid. 
29 Richard S. Kay, The Glorious Revolution and the Continuity of Law, (Catholic University of 
America Press: 2014), at 41. 
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throne and dispose of James II.30 The letter stressed the deep sentiment felt towards King 
James II regarding the suspension and dispensation of the law: 
“As to the first, the people are so generally dissatisfied with the present conduct 
of the government in relation to their religion, liberties and properties (all which 
have been greatly invaded), and they are in such expectation of their prospects 
being daily worse, that Your Highness may be assured there are nineteen parts of 
twenty of the people throughout the kingdom who are desirous of a change and 
who, we believe, would willingly contribute to it, if they had such a protection to 
countenance their rising as would secure them from being destroyed before they 
could get to be in a posture to defend themselves.”31 
William of Orange not only accepted the invitation, but engaged in his own war against 
the king—not simply on the battlefield but in the press-- by publishing the Declarations 
of Reasons in which he justified his armed intervention in England’s affairs.32 In this 
declaration, William of Orange stated:  
“It is both certain and evident to all men, that the public peace and happiness of 
any state or kingdom cannot be preserved where the law, liberties, and customs, 
established by the lawful authority in it, are openly transgressed and annulled; 
more especially, where the alteration of religion is endeavoured, and that a 
religion, which is contrary to law, is endeavoured to be introduced; upon which 
those who are most immediately concerned in it are indispensably bound to 
                                               
30 “The Glorious Revolution,” House of Commons Information Office, (Parliamentary Copyright 
(House of Commons): 2010), found at www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-information-
office/g04.pdf 
31 Andrew Browning, ed., English Historical Documents, 1660-1714, (London: Eyre & 
Spottiswoode, 1953), at 120-122. 
32 Tony Claydon, “William III's Declaration of Reasons and the Glorious Revolution,” 39 The 
Historical Journal 87, (Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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endeavour to preserve and maintain the established laws, liberties, and customs, 
and above all the religion and worship of God that is established among them, 
and to take such an effectual care, that the inhabitants of the said state or 
kingdom may neither be deprived of their religion, nor of their civil rights; which 
is so much the more necessary, being the greatness and security both of kings, 
royal families, and of all such as are in authority, as well as the happiness of their 
subjects and people, depend in a most especial manner upon the exact 
observations and maintenance of these their laws, liberties, and customs.”33 
This, William declared, had not been done; instead, he noted James II’s lack of fidelity 
when implementing parliamentary statutes: 
“[James II’s evil Counsellors] with some plausible pretexts, did invent and set on 
foot the King's dispensing power, by virtue of which they pretend that, according 
to law, he can suspend and dispense with the execution of laws, that have been 
enacted by the authority of the King and Parliament for the security and 
happiness of the subjects, and so have rendered those laws of no effect; though 
there is nothing more certain than that as no laws can be made, but by the joint 
concurrence of King and Parliament, so likewise laws, so enacted, which secure 
the public peace and safety of the nation, and the lives and liberties of every 
subject in it, cannot be repealed or suspended but by the same authority.”34  
This propaganda effort was quite successful; not only was William able to make the 
King’s dispensing power the central target of its attack, but he was also able to discredit 
James II and lay the groundwork to ultimately bring both himself and his wife, Mary, to 
                                               
33 Robert Beddard, ed., A Kingdom without a King: The Journal of the Provisional Government in 
the Revolution of 1688, (Oxford: Phaidon Press, 1988), at 124-128 and 145-149. 
34 Ibid. 
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the throne.35 William’s military and political victory over James II and his ascension to 
the crown became known as the Glorious Revolution. The Glorious Revolution led to a 
radical transformation of the English monarchy and fundamental constitutional changes 
in English law, most remarkably the “shattering of royal claims to absolute power in 
England and the establishing of legal supremacy of Parliament.”36 
As part of a parliamentary agreement, William and Mary were to reign as a joint 
monarchy. They followed their coronation with numerous complaints about James II, and 
a call to action aimed toward Parliament. These very complaints and demands were later 
codified into the English Declaration of Rights in February 12, 1689.37 In sum, the bill 
defined concrete limits on the monarch’s power and the duties expected of a monarch - a 
radical codification of rules that made it clear that the monarchy would never be the same 
again. 
1.2 The Aftermath 
Although England did ultimately resort back to monarchy, the Glorious 
Revolution would leave lasting effects on the country that would be most profoundly felt 
by subsequent monarchs. Parliament’s struggle with the unilateral actions of the Stuart 
Kings served as a catalyst for the prohibition of royal discretionary power to disregard 
statutes.38 Following William of Orange’s military and political victory over James II, 
                                               
35 Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 Texas 
Law Review 781, (2013), at 807.  
36 Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 American University Law Review 259, 
(2009), at 287. Ibid.  
37 Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 Texas 
Law Review 781, (2013), at 807.  
38 Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, The Executive’s Duty To Disregard Unconstitutional Laws, 96 
The Georgetown Law Journal 1613, (2008).  
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there were fundamental constitutional changes in English law; the King of England was 
barred from suspending statutes, authorizing individuals to violate statutes, and most 
importantly, declaring lawful that which statutes had declared unlawful. This inspired 
another shift in the royal prerogative back to its earlier form, where the executive was 
under the law - not above it. These ideas were ultimately immortalized in the English Bill 
of Rights in 1689. What is perhaps most important is how early in its text it abolished the 
suspending and dispensing powers by declaring:  
“... the pretended power of dispensing with laws, or the execution of laws, by 
regal authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal.”39 
This way of viewing and thinking about the power to suspend and dispense inevitably 
permeated America’s own constitutional history alongside the works of Chief Justice 
Coke, which held that the King could not lawfully “change any part of the common law, 
nor create any offence by his proclamation, which was not an offence before, without 
Parliament.”40   
                                               
39 English Bill of Rights 1689. (New Haven: Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008), found at 
avalon.law.yale.edu/17th_century/england.asp. 
40 Case of Proclamations, 77 Eng. Rep. at 1353. John Campbell, The Lives of the Chief Justices of 
England: From the Norman Conquest Till the Death of Lord Mansfield, (London: John Murray, 
Albemarle Street, 1849), at 275. 
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Part 2: The Constitution and the Vision for the Executive 
2.1 The Framers Vision 
 
“[I]t is the particular duty of the Executive ‘to take care that the laws be faithfully 
Executed.”41 
 - President George Washington  
 
Article II Section 3 of the US Constitution expressly requires the President to take 
care that the laws be faithfully executed, but how was it that the delegates arrived at this 
text when constructing the US Constitution? John Dickinson, politician from Philadelphia 
at the time, famously told his fellow delegates that in drafting the new constitution, 
“[e]xperience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead us.”42 The colonists, having 
no other experience of a strong and effective executive power, turned to the English 
monarchy as a source of their inspiration.43 And as such, the English Bill of Rights soon 
became a template for American constitutional drafting.44  
When it came to the dispensing and suspending power, the colonists, similar to 
the English, insisted that America’s executive likewise would have no such authority. 
This understanding was reflected in numerous state constitution provisions drafted prior 
to the drafting of the US Constitution, with each employing this same basic definition of 
                                               
41 Jared Sparks, The Writings of George Washington, (Boston: American Stationers’ Company, 
1837), at 532. 
42 Madison Debates August 13, (New Haven: Lillian Goldman Law Library, 2008), at 
avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/debates_813.asp. 
43 Michael W. McConnell, The Logical Structure Of Article Two, Northwestern School of Law, 
(2016). 
44 Robert J. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 American University Law Review 259, 
(2009), at 281. 
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executive power along with a clause indicating a duty to execute the law to the best of its 
abilities. For example, “with minor variations, this provision was part of the various 
Pennsylvania Frames of Government from 1682 to 1776.”45 The 1776 Pennsylvania 
Constitution contained the following provision: “The president, and in his absence the 
vice-president, with the council… take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”46 
Similarly, the New York Constitution drafted in 1777 laid out a comparable executive 
tasked “to take care that the laws are faithfully executed to the best of his ability.”47 And 
the Virginia Constitution of 1776 “roundly declared that the executive was to exercise the 
executive powers of government, according to the laws of this Commonwealth; and shall 
not, under any pretense, exercise any power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute 
or custom of England.”48 But these constitutional provisions were not merely for show; 
the people of New York, Virginia, and Pennsylvania were adamant about seeing to it that 
the executive did not stray too far from the text. For example, when the Pennsylvania 
Assembly charged special commissioners to draw money from the treasury and conduct 
the state’s defense, the Pennsylvania Executive Council objected that the statute, stating 
that it: “Plainly encroaches on the rights of the people, who have elected you for the 
                                               
45 Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 Texas 
Law Review 781, (2013), at 802.  
46 “Constitution of Pennsylvania - September 28, 1776”, (New Haven: Lillian Goldman Law 
Library, 2008), at avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp. Sai Prakash, “Take Care Clause”, 
In The Heritage Guide To The Constitution, (D.C: The Heritage Foundation, 2007). 
47 “The Constitution of New York : April 20, 1777”, (New Haven: Lillian Goldman Law Library, 
2008), at avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/ny01.asp.  
48 Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 Texas 
Law Review 781, (2013), at 802-803. 
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purpose of devising measures, and us for that of executing them; and so far as we attempt 
to legislate or you to execute... the Pennsylvania Constitution is violated.”49  
Even in their early stages, numerous states observed that the job of the executive 
was to execute the law and not legislate. Fearful of an executive that could disregard and 
act beyond the law, they codified provisions in their Constitutions establishing a duty of 
the executive to execute the law to the best of their abilities; provisions that themselves 
would help to influence the future drafting of the country’s own Constitution. 
2.2 Drafting and Ratifying the U.S Constitution 
In a manner that seemed to mirror the feeling and reasoning of the state 
constitutions, the Constitutional Convention established that the duty of the executive 
branch is to see the execution of the laws. The Framers of the U.S. Constitution carefully 
reflected on the many prerogative powers exercised by the English King and selectively 
granted, denied, or limited those powers when creating Article II Section 3 of the US 
Constitution. One of the powers that the Framers of the US Constitution “took pains to 
ensure that the President lacked” was the authority to “make, or alter, or dispense with 
the laws.”50 
In the Constitutional Convention, when Pierce Butler asked whether “the National 
Executive [would] have a power to suspend any legislative act for a term of [time],”51 
Elbridge Gerry, one of many delegates, expressed his worry stating that “a power of 
suspending might do all the mischief dreaded from the [veto] of useful laws; without 
                                               
49 Pennsylvania. Supreme Executive Council, Minutes of the Supreme Executive Council of 
Pennsylvania: From Its Organization to the Termination of the Revolution, (Harrisburg: 
Pennsylvania, 1853). 
50 Zachary C. Bolitho, The U.S. Constitution, The U.S. Department Of Justice, And State Efforts 
To Legalize Marijuana, 4 Lincoln Memorial University Law Review 42, (2017), at 77. 
51 Max Farrand, ed.,The Records Of The Federal Convention Of 1787, (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1911).  
 18 
answering the salutary purpose of checking unjust or unwise ones.”52 The results, as 
Madison reported, “On question ‘for giving this suspending power’ all the States ... were 
no.”53 In fact, the idea was so unpopular that it was never seriously considered again, and 
in the end the delegates of the Constitutional Convention ultimately approved the 
Executive Power Clause with language that closely resembled the New York 
Constitution’s Faithful Execution for its governor54:  
“The president shall take Care to the best of his Ability, that the Laws . . . of the 
United States be faithfully executed.”55  
The language choice may have largely been the result of one of the delegates: James 
Wilson of Pennsylvania, well-known champion of an energetic executive, was the only 
member of the Committee of Detail from New York or Pennsylvania. Wilson’s draft 
stated that: “It shall be his duty to provide for the due & faithful exec—of the laws.”56 He 
believed in a very restrictive version of the executive office, whose “only powers he 
conceived strictly executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers,” 
and certainly would not have proposed language or idly allowed attempts to undermine 
the executive’s exclusive yet restricted function.57 Years after the Convention, Wilson 
explained that the Clause meant that the President has “authority, not to make, or alter, or 
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dispense with the laws, but to execute and act the laws, which [are] established.”58 Thus, 
although the Committee eventually eliminated the redundant “to the best of his ability” 
and used language which merely provided that the President “shall take care that the laws 
. . . be duly and faithfully executed,” it is clear that the Framers came to understand 
suspending and dispensing the law as the exact opposite of executing the law.  
Thoughts consistent with this interpretation could also be found within the 
critiques of the Anti Federalists, a coalition whose members were largely opposed to the 
passage of the US Constitution on grounds it centralized power. The Anti Federalist, 
“Cato” warned against the presidency stating that: 
“Great power connected with ambition, luxury and flattery, will as readily 
produce a Caesar, Caligula, Nero, and Domitain in America, as the same causes 
did in the Roman Empire."59 
What was significant about the Anti Federalist movement for these purposes was not 
what they mentioned, but what they failed to mention; there seem to be no records of the 
Anti Federalists having ever mentioned or made the claim that the President would hold 
suspending and dispensing powers, even though they had great reason to do so. This is 
particularly telling in its own right, as the common Anti Federalist argument centered 
around the presidency resembling a kingship in everything but name; their seemingly 
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overwhelming historical silence with regard to suspension and dispensation is indicative 
that these were not among the “king-like” powers given to the President.60 
Alexander Hamilton’s response to the Anti Federalist also helped to confirm the 
position that the suspending and dispensing the law were not powers held by the 
executive. In the Federalist Papers, a series of anonymous essays written in support for 
the Constitution, Hamilton reaffirmed the executive’s duty to execute the law. To ease 
the worries and fears surrounding the presidency, Hamilton argued that the “powers 
vested in the President were much less than the prerogatives held by the King,”61 and that 
the “Constitution makes the President, in numerous ways, the constitutional inferior of 
the English Crown.”62 He stated: 
“The one [the President] would have a qualified negative [veto] upon the acts of 
the legislative body: The other [the King] has an absolute negative. The one 
would have a right to command the military and naval forces of the nation: The 
other in addition to this right, possesses that of declaring war, and of raising and 
regulating fleets and armies by his own authority. The one would have a 
concurrent power with a branch of the Legislature in the formation of treaties: 
The other is the sole possessor of the power of making treaties. The one would 
have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices: The other is the sole 
author of all appointments. . . . The one can prescribe no rules concerning the 
commerce or currency of the nation: The other is in several respects the arbiter of 
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commerce . . . . What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us that 
things so unlike resemble each other?”63 
This vision of the executive is also seen in Federalist 47, where James Madison examined 
“the particular structure of this government, and the distribution of this mass of power 
among its constituent parts.”64 Madison argued that:  
“The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same 
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self appointed, or 
elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal 
Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with 
a mixture of powers, having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no 
further arguments would be necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the 
system… In order to form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be proper 
to investigate the sense in which the preservation of liberty requires that the three 
great departments of power should be separate and distinct… From these facts, 
by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be inferred that, in saying 
‘There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in 
the same person, or body of magistrates.’ ”65  
Thus, to be a good executive is to exclusively execute the law. In Federalist No. 
70 Hamilton famously describes “Energy in the executive [as] a leading character in the 
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definition of good government.”66 However, the words “energy in the executive” should 
be viewed within the context of “constitutional history that were well known to the 
Framers [which warned of the] danger of an uncontrolled Executive that regularly 
‘dispensed with’ or ‘suspended’ the law.”67 This, taken along with Federalist No. 77, in 
which Hamilton observed, alluding to the Anti-Federalists’ silence, that “one wholly 
unobjectionable power of the executive lay in faithfully executing the laws” points to 
what is meant by “energy in the executive,” is the energetic execution of the law.68 In 
sum, both Hamilton and Madison, like state constitutions and English conditional 
understanding, were adamant that the executive’s responsibilities be restricted to 
execution as neatly as possible; each of the three branches has a separate and unique role, 
and it borders on tyrannical for any one branch to adopt the role of another. 
2.3 The Constitution and the Take-Care Clause 
The final text determining the power that would be delegated to the executive as 
decided by the Constitutional Convention was as follows: 
“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of 
America.… Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the 
following Oath or Affirmation:--"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will 
faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best 
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of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United 
States."69 
The Constitution requires the President to "Take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed." The purpose of the oath of affirmation was to require the President to “employ 
his executive power to ensure a conscientious execution of Congress’s laws.”70 It is 
important to note that the Constitution differentiates between presidential powers and 
presidential duties, and thus, implies that powers are the tools and processes through 
which a President may execute their duties. This is supported by first examining the ways 
in which the Framers distinguished between the words and the “drafting history of the 
Take-Care Clause at the Philadelphia Convention which supports the natural reading that 
the text imposes a duty and a constraint.”71  
The Take-Care Clause was created for the purpose of preventing “the executive 
from resorting to any of the panoply of devices employed by English Kings to evade the 
will of Parliament.”72 The emphasis on “faithful execution” of the law establishes a 
President’s duty to “honor and enforce statutes that were enacted with their consent or 
over their veto,”73 and as such it can be reasoned that the Take Care Clause was created 
to deny the President the powers for suspending or dispensing law. 
2.4 Conclusion 
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The exact scope of executive power has been a persistent point of debate and 
disagreement ever since the Constitution’s ratification in 1789.74 It is clear, however, that 
since its inception executive power has encompassed the power to execute the laws, 
which differs from the power to legislate. The power of the presidency then was 
envisioned to be “vested with this authority [to] execute any federal law by himself, 
whatever a federal statute might provide.”75 However, it is also evident that the Framers 
feared the expansion of executive power into the other branches of government and tried 
to guard against this. In the end, “the text of the Constitution settles no more than that the 
President is to be the overseer of executive government.”76 From this, it is clear that the 
very text of the Constitution imposes a law enforcement duty, not an affirmative authority 
to suspend or dispense congressional statutes.77  
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Part 3: The Present Day American Presidency and Nonenforcement  
 
“The Administration’s preferred tool for domestic policy, however, is new: using 
prosecutorial discretion” not to enforce statutes with which the President disagrees.” 
- John C. Yoo, Professor of Law 
 
Despite the Constitution’s Take-Care Clause imposing on the President a duty to 
enforce all constitutionally valid acts of Congress in all situations and cases, there 
continue to be deliberate decisions taken by Presidents either to not enforce or selectively 
under enforce law simply for political reasons. However, such a stance should be viewed 
as a breach of the Take-Care Clause and as a violation the US Constitution; failure to 
enforce on a categorical basis for the purpose of furthering a political agenda not only 
lacks constitutional footing, but violates the core principles that were embedded when the 
founders decided on and drafted executive power. Although I do not deny the 
constitutional nature of a President’s refusal to enforce in cases where an act of Congress 
is unconstitutional, resources are limited, or when taking equitable consideration on an 
individual basis,78 this should not be viewed as an equivalent to categorical 
nonenforcement. Granting the executive the power to categorically decide whether or not 
to enforce acts of Congress understood to be consistent with the Constitution would be 
the equivalent of granting the executive the power of suspension and dispensation, the 
very power the Framers feared and spoke out against. As law professor Zachary Price 
observed, “by permitting Presidents to read laws, both old and new, out of the Code for 
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the duration of their presidencies, unrestricted enforcement discretion could provide 
Presidents with a sort of second veto an authority to remake the law on the ground 
without asking Congress to revise the law on the books.”79 
It is truly alarming how little overall scrutiny is given to a presidential decision 
not to execute an act of Congress. Under the Obama administration, there have been 
instances that show a blatant disregard for the enforcement acts of Congress; the 
administration’s refusal to enforce certain federal marijuana crimes as well as its removal 
of statutes against certain undocumented immigrants are two such examples that will be 
explored in detail. In both of these cases, the administration failed to effectively argue for 
or establish the constitutionality of their selective enforcement of the law. This represents 
a strong disregard for departmentalism, the principle where each branch of government 
individually may serve as a check on the constitutionality of a matter; instead, the 
executive exercised its discretion without challenging its constitutional nature.80  
 The Obama administration appealed to an alleged lack of resources that 
necessitated the use of prosecutorial discretion to categorically enforce the law as a 
means of better and more effectively enforcing these statutes. However, the 
administration failed to prove both that they indeed lacked the resources to carry out a 
specific act, and how not enforcing the law toward a certain category of people would 
lead to more effective or better enforcement of the act. More recently, the Trump 
administration has made moves towards the faithful execution of previously ignored 
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Congressional Acts in some aspects, but whether such actions will continue has largely 
been left in the air.  
This uncertainty is troubling; not only does it signal a troubling state for the rule 
of law, but also for the the very structure that lays the foundation for our republic. The 
lackadaisical scrutiny given to President's decision not to enforce a law to further a 
political goal has greatly expanded the power of the presidency beyond anything that 
could have possibly been envisioned by the Framers of the US Constitution. Categorical 
enforcement of Congressional Acts is decidedly unconstitutional; it opens a pathway by 
which Presidents can greatly abuse their power and be placed in a position of choosing 
legal “winners” and “losers”. In allowing a President to suspend and dispense of the law, 
we have created a King-like figure who is above law. 
3.1: The Enforcement of Marijuana Federal Policy 
The Control Substance Act 
In 1970 Congress passed, at President Richard Nixon’s demand, the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 for the purposes of 
“consolidating various drug laws into a comprehensive statute, providing meaningful 
regulation over legitimate sources of drugs to prevent diversion into illegal channels, and 
strengthening law enforcement tools against international and interstate drug 
trafficking.”81 Under Title II of the Act, to “manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or 
possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance” was 
deemed a federal crime.82 More specifically, Title II created five Schedules 
(classifications), with various qualifications for all controlled substances based on “their 
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accepted medical uses, their potential for abuse, and their psychological and physical 
effects on the body.”83 The Act classified marijuana as a Schedule I substance, alongside 
heroin and LSD, based on its “high potential for abuse, no currently accepted medical use 
in treatment in the United States, and ... a lack accepted safety for use under medical 
supervision.”84  
This classification, Schedule I, classified the manufacturing, distribution, or 
possession of marijuana as a criminal offense despite the public opinion’s growing 
movement in favor of marijuana legalization.85 Marijuana’s classification can change, 
however; the Attorney General has the authority under Title II, better known as Control 
Substance Act (CSA), to “add to such a schedule or transfer between such schedules any 
drug or other substance” or “ remove any drug or other substance from the schedules if he 
finds that the drug or other substance does not meet the requirements for inclusion in any 
schedule” following formal rulemaking procedures and a scientific and medical 
evaluation and recommendation from the Secretary of Health and Human Services.86  
States and the Controlled Substance Act 
Following the passing of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act of 1970 and its CSA subsection, many states “enacted uniform drug control laws or 
similar provisions that mirrored the CSA with respect to their treatment of marijuana and 
made the possession, cultivation, and distribution of marijuana a state criminal offense. 
With such overlapping statutory authorities, the federal government and the states 
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traditionally worked as partners in the field of drug enforcement.”87 However, this 
changed starting in 1996; numerous states passed Acts aimed at the legalization and the 
decriminalization of marijuana use for medical purposes.88 In 1996, for example, 
California passed the Compassionate Use Act “to ensure that seriously ill Californians 
have the right to obtain and use marijuana for where that medical use is deemed 
appropriate and has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the 
person’s health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment [...], to ensure 
that patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana for medical 
purposes upon the recommendation of a physician are not subject to criminal prosecution 
or sanction, and to encourage the federal and state governments to implement a plan to 
provide for the safe and affordable distribution of marijuana to all patients in medical 
need of marijuana.”89 In short, the Compassionate Use Act exempted from prosecution 
those patients who possessed medical marijuana under the recommendation of a 
physician.90  
Many states have since followed California’s lead towards the legalization and 
decriminalization of medical marijuana. In 1998, the states of Alaska, Oregon, and 
Washington legalized medical marijuana with Hawaii, Colorado, and Nevada following 
in 2000.91 In 2005, the US Supreme Court established that “Congress’ Commerce Clause 
authority includes the power to prohibit the local cultivation and use of marijuana in 
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compliance with California law.”92 Unfortunately this case, Gonzales v. Raich, did not 
put an end to the tension, as states continued to pass laws in favor of the 
decriminalization and legalization of medical marijuana and even more recently 
recreational marijuana as well. Since 2012, several states have moved to legalize 
recreational marijuana, with Colorado and Washington state becoming the first states to 
vote to on the issue. Since then, six additional states have legalized the recreational use of 
marijuana, with many more looking to legalize in the future. These states “so far have 
landed on a commercialization model, where for-profit, private businesses sell the 
drug.”93 Further, state officials also “enforce some limits on sales, including an age 
requirement (21 and older), how much a person can buy and possess at once, the 
packaging of the product, and taxes.”94 Colorado in particular took steps beyond mere 
legalization by “establishing legal frameworks and taxing and regulatory regimes to deal 
with the state’s marijuana market.”95  
As this discrepancy between the state and federal stances on marijuana became 
deeper and more hotly debated, tension inevitability grew. The ruling remained largely 
missing from the dialog surrounding marijuana’s legalization, and often seemed to have 
been forgotten from the public sphere entirely.  
Under Barack Obama’s Presidency  
 During his presidential campaign, Barack Obama hinted at the nonenforcement 
of federal marijuana laws if elected by stating that he was “not going to be using Justice 
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Department resources to try to circumvent state laws,”96 and such ended up being the 
case when his administration took office. While many have contended Gonzales v. Raich 
was wrongly decided in rejecting states’ rights protections of in-state marijuana policies, 
such were not the grounds that the Obama administration appealed to in declining to 
enforce the CSA in states that legalized marijuana.97 Instead, the Obama administration 
took a “relaxed” approach to the enforcement of marijuana federal law; the Justice 
Department issued a series of memoranda encouraging U.S. Attorneys “to exercise 
prosecutorial discretion to target specified federal marijuana enforcement priorities, 
including preventing the use of marijuana by minors, ensuring state authorized marijuana 
sales do not intersect with other illegal activity, preventing driving under the influence of 
marijuana, and precluding marijuana use on public and federal land.”98 This decision was 
made despite that on numerous occasions, Congress had both declined to pass legislation 
that would end federal enforcement of the prohibition of marijuana in states that had 
already halted enforcement on the state level and “refused to pass amendments to 
appropriations bills that would prohibit the use of appropriated funds to obstruct state 
legalization of medical marijuana on several occasions.”99  
In a series of memoranda, the Obama administration established a legal 
framework that effectively ended most of the enforcement of the CSA in the states that 
had legalized marijuana. On October 19, 2009, the Justice Department issued a 
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memorandum directed at U.S. Attorneys urging them not to focus federal resources on 
the prosecution of “individuals whose actions are in clear and unambiguous compliance 
with existing state laws providing for the medical use of marijuana.”100 Furthermore, the 
memorandum stated that although the “United States Attorneys are invested by statute 
and delegation from the Attorney General with the broadest discretion in the exercise of 
such authority [that this] authority should, of course, be exercised consistent with 
Department priorities and guidance.”101 On June 29, 2011 the Justice Department 
clarified the 2009 directive stating that it “was never intended to shield large scale 
growing operations from federal enforcement” and that “persons who are in the business 
of cultivating, selling or distributing marijuana, and those who knowingly facilitate such 
activities, are in violation of the Controlled Substances Act, regardless of state law.”102 
The August 29, 2013 memorandum announced updates on guidance stating that “it will 
not prioritize the enforcement of federal marijuana laws in states with their own robust 
marijuana regulations and specified eight federal enforcement priorities to help guide 
state lawmaking,” noting that “the Department of Justice has not historically devoted 
resources to prosecuting individuals whose conduct is limited to possession of small 
amounts of marijuana for personal use on private property.”103 And in February 14, 2014, 
the memorandum addressed the “application of prosecutorial discretion in cases or 
investigations involving financial institutions providing services to marijuana 
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businesses.”104 Furthermore, it “indicated that prosecutors should focus prosecutorial 
efforts on financial institutions working with marijuana businesses suspected of violating 
these enforcement priorities.”105  
What is problematic about the series of memorandums under Deputy Attorney 
General James Cole was that federal law was being suspended: the decision of whether to 
prosecute was not being made on a case by case basis, in which a federal prosecutor 
“consider[s] the evidence, look[s] at the circumstances, apply[s] the factors set forth in 
the U.S. Attorney’s Manual, and decide[s] whether a prosecution is warranted against a 
particular suspect. Rather, there is an articulated nonenforcement policy that effectively 
exempts the residents of twenty-six states from federal marijuana law.”106 Deputy 
Attorney General Cole attempted to justify the administration’s selective nonenforcement 
tactics by stating that “given scarce resources for enforcement, federal prosecutors must 
set priorities for enforcement.”107 For example, the 2009 memorandum states that the 
Department was “committed to making efficient and rational use of its limited 
investigative and prosecutorial resources.”108 However, the Obama administration has 
provided no evidence to prove the validity of such a claim; it has failed to provide 
“estimates of what the cost savings from its initiative would be… [And] even more 
importantly, the administration has not explained why, if enforcement priorities and cost 
                                               
104 “Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole, Memorandum For Selected United States 
Attorneys,” The United States Department of Justice, 14 February 2014. 
105 Rosalie Winn, Hazy Future: The Impact of Federal and State Legal Dissonance on Marijuana 
Businesses, 53 American Criminal Law Review 215, (2016).  
106 Zachary C. Bolitho, The U.S. Constitution, The U.S. Department Of Justice, And State Efforts 
To Legalize Marijuana, 4 Lincoln Memorial University Law Review 42, (2017), at 84. 
107 Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 Vanderbilt Law Review 
671, (2014), at 758. 
108 “Deputy Attorney General David W. Ogden, Memorandum For Selected United States 
Attorneys,” The United States Department of Justice, 19 October 2009. 
 34 
savings dictated its nonenforcement decision,” it chose to waive enforcement on states 
that have legalized marijuana while Congress had explicitly decided against this.109  
There is a lack of evidence that the Obama administration’s decision to 
categorically enforce the CSA was based on limited resources; since it failed to justify the 
CSA’s categorical enforcement on constitutional grounds, it appears that perhaps a 
political reason was a driving motivator for the decision not to enforce federal law to 
certain categories of people. But an Attorney General cannot simply use the “doctrine of 
prosecutorial discretion to justify the creation of a policy against enforcing a particular 
provision of federal law;”110 prosecutorial discretion is not a tool by which the executive 
can simply disregard Congressional Acts, as such an action would be in direct violation 
of the Faithfully Execute Clause. The deregulation of marijuana could have been 
executed through legal means as described by Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970; the administration could have pushed for the 
reclassification of marijuana. However, President Obama himself has pushed back 
against the efforts by Democratic governors from both Rhode Island and Washington to 
adjust the classification of marijuana and how federal law enforcement treats it, denying 
bids to reclassify the schedule of marijuana and ignoring Congress’s typical protocol, 
instead contributing the overexpansion of the executive’s reach.111  
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The Obama administration, “unable or unwilling to change federal policy in these 
areas through legislation… sought to use its enforcement discretion to achieve its 
preferred policy outcomes.”112 It utilized selective nonenforcement to further a political 
agenda, and with it completely rewrote the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970. While the President’s veto power authorizes him to intervene in the 
legislative process in certain defined situations, the US Constitution’s meaning and 
original intent of executive power dictate that there can be no “commensurate power to 
unilaterally nullify laws that have already passed through the requisite legislative 
channels,”113 as doing so would be to grant the President with the power of suspension 
and dispensation. In this case, the Obama administration turned to using “prosecutorial 
discretion” to not enforce statutes with which the President disagrees.114 However, when 
a policy ceases to apply on a case-by-case basis and becomes a “pattern of non 
enforcement,” the result is the expansion of executive power beyond the scope granted to 
the President under Article II and the violation and departure from the President’s duty to 
faithfully execute the law. 
The Trump Administration 
The Trump administration, at least in the beginning, took a hard-line approach, 
allowing federal prosecutors to crack down on marijuana even in states that have ruled in 
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favor of its legality, turning away from the guidance of the Obama administration.115 In a 
January 4, 2018 memorandum, Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated that prosecutors 
should use their “discretion in weighing whether charges were warranted, rather than 
abiding by the Obama-era guidance.” The memorandum states: 
"It is the mission of the Department of Justice to enforce the laws of the United 
States, and the previous issuance of guidance undermines the rule of law and the 
ability of our local, state, tribal, and federal law enforcement partners to carry 
out this mission… Therefore, today's memo on federal marijuana enforcement 
simply directs all U.S. Attorneys to use previously established prosecutorial 
principles that provide them all the necessary tools to disrupt criminal 
organizations, tackle the growing drug crisis, and thwart violent crime across our 
country."116 
At this point, it appeared as through a previous neglected Congressional Act, the Drug 
Abuse Prevention and Control Act, would be enforced under the new administration. This 
potentially changed, however, in a phone call that took place only a couple of months 
later. On April 11, 2018, Trump told Senator Cory Gardner over the phone that “despite 
the Department of Justice, the marijuana industry in Colorado will not be targeted” in 
exchange for Gardner backing down from his months-long hold on new Justice 
Department nominees.117 The deal with Colorado is particularly troublesome because as 
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previously mentioned, Colorado state law does not simply decriminalize marijuana, but it 
“establishe[d] [a] legal framework and taxing and regulatory regimes to deal with the 
state’s marijuana market.”118 
Although the exact implications of Trump's promise not to target Colorado, which 
is nothing more than mere words at this point, are currently unknown, they exemplify the 
problematic nature of allowing a President to selectively and deliberately choose not to 
enforce law to further a political agenda. It is apparent that a deal was reached between 
President Trump and Senator Gardner; Trump claimed that he would not target Colorado 
for the enforcement of Controlled Substances Act and in exchange, Senator Gardner 
claimed that he would support several of Trump’s nominees he had been blocking. In this 
particular case, the decision to execute a law is being used as a tool of coercion, allowing 
the President to further a political agenda that is not directly related to the CSA itself. 
However, what is most worrisome about this particular scenario is that, based on the 
massive expansion of executive power and the little scrutiny given to a President’s 
decision not to execute a Congressional Act, Trump could very much decide to 
categorically deem the state of Colorado as being of “low priority” for enforcing the CSA 
along with any other states with which he strikes a deal. The justification could be, as 
seen by previous administrations, considered the use prosecutorial discretion as the result 
of limited resources.  
Although in the past Trump has claimed his support for states rights when it 
comes to marijuana legalization stating that “[he] think[s] that should be a state issue, 
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state by state,”119 I am doubtful that if a decision is made to not enforce CSA in “certain 
states” it would be due to its constitutionality or lack thereof. The current presidential 
level debate surrounding the disparity between state and federal marijuana legislation 
lacks constitutional basis; there is no debate that begins to question the Supreme Court 
decision, Gonzales v Raich. Allowing the President to selectively and categorically 
enforce a law not on constitutional grounds, but for furthering a policy agenda, greatly 
expands the power of the presidency and stands in direct violation of Article II of the US 
Constitution. 
 It becomes clear now that the President, exercising selective nonenforcement, is 
exercising unauthorized and unwarranted power that is in violation of the Faithfully 
Execute Clause. Permitting Trump to use the loose interpretation of “prosecutorial 
discretion” to choose where to enforce Congressional Acts would essentially be to allow 
him to engage in picking “winners” and “losers”. Not only would the scope of a certain 
law be completely altered, but the power of the executive would grow to levels feared 
and argued against by the Framers; there would now be a coercive “incentive for 
members of Congress to bypass each other in fashioning legislation and to deal directly 
with the Executive instead.”120 The President would be acting like a King, ignoring the 
legislative branch altogether.  
The job of the President is to execute law, which is the distinct from the law-
making power granted to the legislative branch. The Supreme Court has ruled that the 
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law, “like the beneficent author of our existence, is no respecter of persons it is inflexible 
and even handed, and should not be subservient to any improper consideration or views. 
Granting the President discretion to exempt particular individuals from general statutory 
prohibitions, in other words, would conflict with the basic commitment to the rule of law 
in the United States, ´which we have been always led to consider as a government not of 
men, but of laws, of which the constitution is the basis.”121 As the President continues to 
selectively and categorically enforce the CSA, he is no doubt exercising the powers of 
dispensing and suspending of the law: the very powers that were to be implicitly denied 
by the US Constitution.  
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3:2 The Enforcement of Immigration Policy 
The Immigration and Naturalization Act 
In 1952, Congress passed the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA), or the 
McCarran-Walter Act, which created a “comprehensive immigration policy for the 
United States [that] set forth categories of foreign nationals who are not permitted to 
enter the United States and of persons who, if present in the United States, are subject to 
removal (formerly deportation).”122 Originally the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (INS) was in charge of many immigration service and enforcement functions. 
However, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to take over many of these functions. More 
specifically, the Immigration and Custom Enforcement (ICE), a department within the 
Department of Homeland Security, is charged with the enforcement of the INA and has 
the primary responsibility for implementing its provisions.123 
The Immigration and Nationality Act as amended defines under Section 
212(a)(9)(B)(ii) of the Act, “that an alien is deemed to be unlawfully present in the 
United States, if the alien is: present after the expiration of the period of stay authorized 
by the Secretary of Homeland Security; or present without being admitted or paroled.”124 
The Immigration and Naturalization Act consists of the following provisions: “In 
general, any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the purpose of performing 
skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible, unless the Secretary of Labor has determined 
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and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that— (I) there are not 
sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in the case of an 
alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a visa and 
admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform such skilled 
or unskilled labor, and (II) the employment of such alien will not adversely affect the 
wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly employed.”125 
The Obama Administration and Immigration Reform 
 
“I am president, I am not king. I can’t do these things just by myself.”  
- President Barack Obama 
 
Even during his 2008 presidential campaign, Barack Obama made it clear that 
immigration reform was among his key platforms; and when in office, it became one of 
his key legislative priorities.126 However, time and time again, Congress failed to pass 
any of the administration’s proposed initiative on immigration,127 one of which being the 
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act. As noted by Professor John C. 
Yoo, the DREAM Act has a storied history that is wrought with a lack of congressional 
approval; despite having been taken up by Congress each year from 2006 through 2011, 
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the bill’s journey saw challenges at each step of the way.128 The DREAM Act proposed 
the following:  
“[To authorize] the Secretary of Homeland Security to cancel the removal of, and 
adjust to conditional permanent resident status, an alien who: (1) entered the 
United States before his or her 16th birthday and has been present in the United 
States for at least five years immediately preceding enactment of this Act; (2) is a 
person of good moral character; (3) is not inadmissible or deportable under 
specified grounds of the Immigration and Nationality Act; (4) at the time of 
application, has been admitted to an institution of higher education or has earned 
a high school or equivalent diploma; (5) from the age of 16 and older, has never 
been under a final order of exclusion, deportation, or removal; and (6) was under 
age 35 on the date of this Act's enactment.” 
Further, the Act goes on to state that it authorized “an alien who has satisfied the 
appropriate requirements prior to enactment of this Act to petition the Secretary for 
conditional permanent resident status.”129 
The fact that Congress failed to pass the DREAM Act did not stop the Obama 
administration from pursuing its enforcement. Although he was aware of the process to 
accomplish it legislatively, Obama because frustrated by his inability to pass the DREAM 
Act into a law. And thus, upon failing to pass the DREAM Act through legislative means, 
the Obama administration turned to “pursue major immigration goals by administrative 
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means alone.”130 Using the NIA, President Barack Obama used a broad and unwarranted 
use of prosecutorial discretion to further his political agenda. This becomes apparent 
when analyzing the requirements for non enforcement of the NIA, which are very similar 
to those seen the in the DREAM Act.  
On June 5, 2012, Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Homeland Security, released a 
memorandum to David V. Aguilar Acting Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection stating that: 
“The following criteria should be satisfied before an individual is considered for 
an exercise of prosecutorial discretion pursuant to this memorandum: (1) came to 
the United States under the age of sixteen; (2) has continuously resided in the 
United States for a least five years preceding the date of this memorandum and is 
present in the United States on the date of this memorandum; (3) is currently in 
school, has graduated from high school, has obtained a general education 
development certificate, or is an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast 
Guard or Armed Forces of the United States; (4) has not been convicted of a 
felony offense, a significant misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor offenses, 
or otherwise poses a threat to national security or public safety; and (5) is not 
above the age of thirty. ”131 
Ten days later on June 15, 2012, Secretary Napolitano issued a memorandum establishing 
Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals, or DACA. The memorandum states that:  
                                               
130 Robert J. Delahunty and John C. Yoo, Dream On: The Obama Administration’s 
Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause, 91 Texas 
Law Review 781, (2013), at 789.  
131 “Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano to David V. Aguilar, Memorandum from 
Acting Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect 
to Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children,” The United States Department of 
Homeland Security, 5 June 2012.  
 44 
“I [Napolitano] am setting forth how, in the exercise of our prosecutorial 
discretion, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should enforce the 
Nation's immigration laws against certain young people who were brought to this 
country as children and know only this country as home. As a general matter, 
these individuals lacked the intent to violate the law and our ongoing review of 
pending removal cases is already offering administrative closure to many of 
them.”132  
Under DACA, a young immigrant would be able to apply for deferred action on their 
immigration status in two-year, renewable intervals so long as they satisfied the 
following criteria:133 “(1) came to the United States under the age of sixteen; (2) has 
continuously resided in the United States for a least five years preceding the date of this 
memorandum and is present in the United States on the date of this memorandum; (3) is 
currently in school, has graduated from high school, has obtained a general education 
development certificate, or is an honorably discharged veteran of the Coast Guard or 
Armed Forces of the United States; (4) has not been convicted of a felony offense, a 
significant misdemeanor offense, multiple misdemeanor offenses, or otherwise poses a 
threat to national security or public safety; and (5) is not above the age of thirty.”134  
On the same date that DACA was established, the 15th of June 2012, President 
Obama addressed a new policy from the Department of Homeland Security allegedly 
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aimed at “making the nation’s immigration policy more fair and more efficient.”135 
President Obama announced: 
 “This morning, Secretary Napolitano announced new actions my administration 
will take to mend our nation’s immigration policy, to make it more fair, more 
efficient, and more just -- specifically for certain young people sometimes called 
“Dreamers”… I have said time and time and time again to Congress that, send 
me the DREAM Act, put it on my desk, and I will sign it right away …. In the 
absence of any immigration action from Congress to fix our broken immigration 
system, what we’ve tried to do is focus our immigration enforcement resources in 
the right places… the Department of Homeland Security is taking steps to lift the 
shadow of deportation from these young people. Over the next few months, 
eligible individuals who do not present a risk to national security or public safety 
will be able to request temporary relief from deportation proceedings and apply 
for work authorization.”136 
The effects of DACA were profound; as reported by the U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, there are approximately 689,800 active DACA recipients as of 
Sept. 4, 2017.137 
DAPA 
The Obama administration did not stop at DACA, however. On November 20, 
2014, it imposed yet another aggressive immigration agenda that sought to expand on 
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DACA; the program became later know as DAPA or Deferred Action for Parents of 
Americans. DAPA was established in a memorandum by Secretary Jeh Charles Johnson 
which starts by stating that “... due to limited resources, DHS and its Components cannot 
respond to all immigration violations or remove all persons illegally in the United States. 
As is true of virtually every other law enforcement agency, DHS must exercise 
prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of the law.”138 Then, it proceeds to summarize 
the changes that DAPA bring: 1) DACA will apply to all otherwise eligible immigrants 
regardless of how old they were in June 2012 or are today, 2) The period for which 
DACA and the accompanying employment authorization is granted will be extended to 
three-year increments, rather than the current two-year increments, 3) and the date-of-
entry requirement will be adjusted from June 15, 2007 to January 1, 2010. More 
controversially, the memorandum also established an expansion of the concept and 
categorization of “Deferred Action.”139  
Secretary Jeh Charles Johnson directed the United States Citizenship and 
Immigration Services “to establish a process, similar to DACA, for exercising 
prosecutorial discretion through the use of deferred action, on a case-by-case basis, to 
those individuals who have, on the date of this memorandum, a son or daughter who is a 
U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident; have continuously resided in the United States 
since before January 1, 2010; are physically present in the United States on the date of 
this memorandum, and at the time of making a request for consideration of deferred 
action with USCIS; have no lawful status on the date of this memorandum; are not an 
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enforcement priority as reflected in the November 20, 2014 Policies for the 
Apprehension, Detention and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants Memorandum; and 
present no other factors that, in the exercise of discretion, makes the grant of deferred 
action inappropriate.”140 
To put it short, DAPA expanded DACA by allowing for deferred action toward 
parents who entered the US illegally, but who have children who were either born in the 
United States or have a lawful permanent status. Similarly, people who meet the 
eligibility criteria under DAPA are eligible to apply for “work authorization for the 
period of deferred action” and for certain benefits.141  
Only a month after its establishment, DAPA was challenged in court by Texas 
and 25 other states who claimed that the program violated both the Take-Care Clause of 
the US Constitution and the “substantive and procedural requirements” of the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA)142, a law enacted in 1946 with the purpose to 
regulate administrative agencies.143 The Fifth Circuit rightfully ruled against DAPA, 
noting that “DAPA is foreclosed by Congress’s careful plan; the program is ‘manifestly 
contrary to the statute’ and therefore was properly enjoined.”144 The case, U.S. v. Texas, 
later came before the Supreme Court, who on June 23, 2016 announced in a one sentence 
                                               
140 Ibid.  
141 Ibid. 
142 Sam Kamin, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of Immigration and Marijuana Law 
Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 Ohio State Journal Of Criminal Law 183, 
(2016), at 195. 
143 Roni A. Elias, The Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure Act, 27 Fordham 
Environmental Law Review 207, (2016). 
144 Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 134 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 48 
decision that “The judgement is affirmed by an equally divided court.”145 Due to the 4 to 
4 split in the justices’ opinions, the ruling set no precedent.  
Suspension and Dispensation of INA 
 
“The power of executing the laws necessarily includes both authority and responsibility 
to resolve some questions left open by Congress that arise during the law’s 
administration. But it does not include a power to revise clear statutory terms that turn 
out not to work in practice.”146 
- Justice Antonin Scalia 
 
The problem with both DACA and DAPA is that they serve as mechanisms 
through which the Obama administration effectively suspend and dispense with the law. 
Both programs go beyond lacking the proper statutory authority; they undermine the INA 
and the ruling of Congress. As mentioned previously, Congress did not pass the DREAM 
Act, despite it being brought before them on numerous occasions. Due to the strong 
parallels between the DREAM Act and the DACA memorandum that followed its 
rejection, unilatery enforcing DACA would be a similar equivalent to enforcing the 
DREAM Act. The resemblance between the criteria in order to be granted deferred status 
under both DACA and the DREAM Act is undeniable; both include aliens who came to 
the United States under the age of sixteen, have continuously resided here for at least five 
years and are currently present, are a student, high school graduate, GED certificate 
holder, or veteran; have not had a significant criminal record or otherwise pose a threat to 
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national security or public safety; and are thirty years old or younger. Further, it is worth 
pointing out that those students who would meet the eligibility criteria under the DREAM 
Act would have also been eligible to apply to the Department of Homeland Security for 
deferred action under DACA.147 It is also impossible to ignore Obama’s own words when 
he asserted that he would be using the DHS to “mend” the INA as the result of an 
“absence of any immigration action from Congress to fix our broken immigration 
system.”148 Thus, the selective nonenforcement of the INA was a method by which the 
Obama administration could accomplish a political agenda all while bypassing Congress. 
To justify their decision to not enforce the INA to certain categories of people, the 
Obama administration claimed to be using prosecutorial discretion to “more 
efficient[ly]”149 enforce the INA. And although I do not argue against the premise that 
prosecutorial discretion lies within the powers given to the President, I do not believe that 
the method by which the INA failed to be enforced equates to prosecutorial discretion. 
The Obama administration, within the many memorandums allegedly guiding 
enforcement through prioritization, turned to prosecutorial discretion as the result of 
limited resources to justify selective nonenforcement of the INA. For example, the June 
15, 2014 memorandum states that “... additional measures are necessary to ensure that 
our enforcement resources are not expended on these low priority cases but are instead 
appropriately focused on people who meet our enforcement priorities.”150 Similarly, the 
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June 20, 2014 memorandum which established DAPA states that: “Due to limited 
resources, DHS and its Components cannot respond to all immigration violations or 
remove all persons illegally in the United States. As is true of virtually every other law 
enforcement agency, DHS must exercise prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of 
the law.”151 However, the Obama administration at no time provided any evidence to 
substantiate the claim of limited resources or seeked supplemental appropriations from 
Congress to cover the cost of full enforcement; instead it only considered an allegedly 
cost-saving solution in the discretionary nonenforcement of the same selection of people 
that had previously been decided not to receive such relief by Congress.152  
Not only has the Obama administration failed to prove how the DACA and 
DAPA programs would be the best use of the alleged limited resources, but to carry out 
the background checks required by both the DACA and DAPA programs would call for 
an increase of resources not found within the DHS and its components. In his dissent in 
Arizona v. United States, Justice Scalia commented on the Obama administration’s 
immigration policy stating that153 “The husbanding of scarce enforcement resources can 
hardly be the justification for this, since those resources will be eaten up by the 
considerable administrative cost of conducting the nonenforcement program, which will 
require as many as 1.4 million background checks and biennial rulings on requests for 
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dispensation.”154 Justice Scalia's claim appears to be substantiated by a Wall Street 
Journal Article, in which reporter Miriam Jordan states that as a result of the programs, 
“The Department of Homeland Security expects to receive 3,000 applications a day and 
will need to hire more than 1,400 full-time workers, as well as contract labor, according 
to sources familiar with the situation.”155 If it is true that DACA and DAPA resulted in an 
a need for more resources, as is apparent was the case, the Obama administration’s 
decision to not enforce INA cannot be said to be the result of economic prioritization. 
However, the problematic nature of DACA and DAPA does not stop at an 
unjustified claim of limited resources defending prosecutorial inaction. Through DACA 
and DAPA, eligible aliens could receive benefits that not only altered the scope of the 
Immigration and Naturalization Act, but stand in direct violation of it. Under DAPA, 
certain people who entered the country illegally would be “permitted a lawful 
presence”156, which is contrary to their designated “unlawful presence” under the INA.157 
Furthermore, anyone granted deferred action under DACA and DAPA would also be 
entitled to apply for work authorization, a right that is explicitly illegal under the INA 
which states that “in general, any alien who seeks to enter the United States for the 
purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is inadmissible.”158 And as a product of 
receiving work permits, DAPA and DACA recipients could be eligible for Social 
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Security, tax credits, and Medicare.159 It is important to note that outside a few statutory 
exceptions, these rights are denied in absolute to every person in this country unlawfully, 
unlike deportation which involves enforcement discretion.160 The work authorization for 
an unauthorized person, for example is impermissible “unless the Secretary of Labor has 
determined and certified to the Secretary of State and the Attorney General that— (I) 
there are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qualified (or equally qualified in 
the case of an alien described in clause (ii)) and available at the time of application for a 
visa and admission to the United States and at the place where the alien is to perform 
such skilled or unskilled labor, and (II) the employment of such alien will not adversely 
affect the wages and working conditions of workers in the United States similarly 
employed.”161  
In order to grant these benefits to immigrants with unlawful presence, the Obama 
administration had to suspend the law or grant dispensations from the INA, effcictly 
making legal that which is illegal; in ignoring both the decisions of Congress and a 
statutory act, the administration grants certain categories of people the very benefit that 
Congress has denied them.162 The New York Times estimated that “just under half of the 
nation’s unauthorized immigrant population – estimated currently at about 11 million – 
could have potentially benefited from programs President Obama announced in 
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November 2014.”163 Both DACA and DAPA would completely alter the scope of the 
INA, undermining the Act altogether. Similar to King James II, who accomplished the 
goal of restoring Catholicism as the established religion by issuing a Declaration of 
Indulgence that suspended the “ecclesiastical laws” and granting dispensations that 
“exempted large numbers of Catholics from the Test Act,” the Obama administration 
suspended the INA and granted dispensions to large numbers of people to accomplish a 
policy agenda. However, it is crucial to the original meaning and intent of the US 
Constitution not to allow the executive to suspend statutes, authorize individuals to 
violate statutes, or declare lawful the conduct that statutes declare unlawful.164 To do so 
would be to effectively allow the executive branch to be above the law, standing in direct 
violation of the Take-Care Clause.  
The Trump Administration 
Following the 2016 presidential election, DACA seemed to be coming to an end 
as a new administration vocal against the program took office. Even from the beginning 
of his 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump has been adamant about cracking down 
on illegal immigration, going as far as proposing the construction of a wall along the US-
Mexico border. Emphasizing an America-first rhetoric, Trump promised to “immediately 
terminate” DACA if elected.165 At this point he defined DACA “an illegal executive 
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order” which “defied federal law and the Constitution.”166 When Trump took office on 
the 20th of January 2017, however, his stance on the issue began to change; he began to 
voice a more empathic stance to both DACA and the immigrants protected by it.167 In an 
January interview with ABC for example, Trump stated that “[Dreamers] shouldn’t be 
very worried.”168 This direction did not last long, however; on January 25, 2017, 
President Trump issued an executive order in which he directed executive departments 
and agencies to “ensure the public safety of the American people in communities across 
the United States as well as to ensure that our Nation’s immigration laws are faithfully 
executed” and established new “enforcement priorities.”169 And on February 20, 2017, 
John F. Kelly, Secretary of Homeland Security, issued a memorandum implementing 
Trump’s executive order stating that “effective immediately, and consistent with Article 
II, Section 3 of the United States Constitution and Section 3331 of Title 5, United States 
Code, Department personnel shall faithfully execute the immigration laws of the United 
States against all removable aliens.”170 Although Kelly’s memorandum did not formally 
withdraw Napolitano’s DACA, it reinforced a position against DACA and the 
enforcement priorities of the Obama administration. 
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Donald Trump continued to go back and forth on his DACA stance during his 
first months in office, leaving the future of DACA and its recipients ultimately 
uncertain.171 But this changed on September 5, 2017, when Jeff Session wrote a letter to 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Elaine Duke, advising the rescinding of DACA, making 
a vague reference to its constitutionality.172 This letter was than followed by a 
memorandum by Secretary Elaine Duke the same day that terminated the June 2012 
memorandum issued by Secretary Janet Napolitano which had established DACA.173 In 
the memorandum, Duke stated that after careful consideration by the Department of 
Justice, they had “evaluated the program’s Constitutionality and determined it conflicts 
with our existing immigration laws” and therefore will begin the winding down of the 
program “in an orderly fashion that protects beneficiaries in the near-term while working 
with Congress to pass legislation.” It laid out that the Department of Homeland Security:  
“Will adjudicate—on an individual, case-by-case basis—properly filed pending 
DACA initial requests and associated applications for Employment Authorization 
Documents that have been accepted by the Department as of the date of this 
memorandum; Will reject all DACA initial requests and associated applications 
for Employment Authorization Documents filed after the date of this 
memorandum; Will adjudicate—on an individual, case by case basis—properly 
filed pending DACA renewal requests and associated applications for 
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Employment Authorization Documents from current beneficiaries that have been 
accepted by the Department as of the date of this memorandum, and from current 
beneficiaries whose benefits will expire between the date of this memorandum and 
March 5, 2018 that have been accepted by the Department as of October 5, 2017; 
Will reject all DACA renewal requests and associated applications for 
Employment Authorization Documents filed outside of the parameters specified 
above; Will not approve any new Form I-131 applications for advance parole 
under standards associated with the DACA program, although it will generally 
honor the stated validity period for previously approved applications for advance 
parole; Will continue to exercise its discretionary authority to terminate or deny 
deferred action at any time when immigration officials determine termination or 
denial of deferred action is appropriate.”174 
In sum, the September 5, 2017 memorandum was a move towards rescinding 
DACA with officials at the “Department of Homeland Security no longer accepting new 
applications for DACA other than those submitted before Tuesday.”175 In a tweet on 
September 5, 2017, Trump stated that “Congress now has 6 months to legalize DACA... 
If they can't, [he] will revisit this issue!”176 In ending DACA, Trump promised that he 
would “treat the program’s beneficiaries with ‘great heart’ and that he would ‘revisit this 
issue’ should Congress fail to strike a deal by his self-imposed deadline.”177 The “orderly 
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wind down” of DACA did not go uncontested however; following the Trump 
administration’s announcement to terminate DACA, many states challenged the decision. 
 The first lawsuit was filed on January 9, 2018 in the Northern District of 
California. District Court Judge William Alsup started the case by stating: “One question 
presented in these related actions is whether the new administration terminated DACA 
based on a mistake of law rather than in compliance with the law.”178 However in doings 
so, Judge Alsup turned exclusively on the statutory question as opposed to the much 
needed constitutional justification for the termination of DACA.179 Judge Alsup then 
proceeds to examined the Trump administration's case pointing out that: 
 “The government filed an administrative record on October 6. It was merely, 
however, fourteen documents comprising 256 pages of which 187 consisted of 
published opinions from the DAPA litigation, and all of which already resided in 
the public domain.... Although government counsel further indicated, upon 
inquiry by the district judge, that the decision maker had also likely received 
verbal input, nothing was included in the administrative record to capture this 
input. Nor were there any materials regarding the agency’s earlier, recent 
decisions to leave DACA in place.”180 
Judge Alsup then concludes that “DACA fell within the agency’s enforcement authority. 
The contrary conclusion was flawed and should be set aside.” 181  
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The second of the lawsuits was filed on February 13, 2018 in the Eastern District 
of New York. District Court Judge Nicholas Garaufis ruled that: 
“The question before the court is thus not whether Defendants could end the 
DACA program, but whether they offered legally adequate reasons for doing so. 
Based on its review of the record before it, the court concludes that Defendants 
have not done so. First, the decision to end the DACA program appears to rest 
exclusively on a legal conclusion that the program was unconstitutional and 
violated the APA and INA. Because that conclusion was erroneous, the decision 
to end the DACA program cannot stand. Second, this erroneous conclusion 
appears to have relied in part on the plainly incorrect factual premise that courts 
have recognized constitutional defects in the somewhat analogous Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents ( DAPA ) 
program. Third, Defendants' decision appears to be internally contradictory, as 
the means by which Defendants chose to wind down the program(namely, by 
continuing to adjudicate certain DACA renewal applications) cannot be 
reconciled with their stated rationale for ending the program (namely, that DACA 
as unconstitutional).”182 
Further, Judge Garaufis rightly points out the invalidity of the Trump administration’s 
attempt to reframe the motivation for the decision to end the DACA on the “litigation 
risk” from Texas and several other states who would seek to challenge DACA.183 Thus, 
Judge Garaufis concludes that the Trump administration “must continue processing both 
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initial DACA applications and DACA renewal requests under the same terms and 
conditions that applied before September 5, 2017.” 
Up until this point, both the Judge Garaufis and Judge Alsup had “each issued 
injunctions ordering that the program remain in place. But neither of those decisions 
required the government to accept new applications.”184 This changed, however, in the 
most recent lawsuit against the Trump administration’s decision to rescind DACA, which 
was filed on March 24, 2018 in the District of Columbia. In his ruling, Judge Bates 
scrutinized the Trump administration’s decision to rescind DACA on weak constitutional 
grounds. He stated: 
“The Department’s explanation for its conclusion that DACA was 
unconstitutional was equally opaque. The Sessions Letter made a fleeting 
reference to the Attorney General’s ‘duty to … faithfully execute the laws passed 
by Congress,’ which could be read to invoke the President’s constitutional duty to 
‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’ But the letter made no attempt to 
explain why DACA breached that duty. This failure was particularly acute in light 
of a thirty-three page memorandum prepared in 2014 by the Office of Legal 
Counsel (“OLC”), which deduced ‘from the nature of the Take Care duty’ no 
fewer than ‘four general … principles governing the permissible scope of 
enforcement discretion’ and concluded that DAPA, a similar deferred-action 
program, was consistent with all of them.”185 
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Judge Bates described the Trump administration’s decision to rescind DACA as 
“arbitrary and capricious because the Department failed adequately to explain its 
conclusion that the program was unlawful.”186 Similar to Judge Garaufis, Judge Bates 
then proceeds to argue the inadequate merit of the Trump administration’s decision to 
end DACA on the fear of litigation from Texas and other states threatening to sue. Judge 
Garaufis states that “neither the meager legal reasoning nor the assessment of litigation 
risk provided by DHS to support its rescission decision is sufficient to sustain termination 
of the DACA program.”187 Further, Judge Bates expressed the tension between the 
decision to rescind DACA by saying it was unconstitutional while still ostensibly 
upholding the 2014 Obama OLC defense of DACA, thus inspiring the need for the 
Trump administration to reconcile the two. 
Judge Bates concludes his ruling stating that “... the decision to rescind DACA 
will be vacated and remanded to DHS. Vacatur of DACA’s rescission will mean that 
DHS must accept and process new as well as renewal DACA applications.”188 In his 
conclusion, Judge Bates provides an ultimatum, “the Court will stay its order of vacatur 
for ninety days, however, to allow the agency an opportunity to better explain its 
rescission decision.”189  
Analysis of the Decision to Rescind DACA 
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“Without providing any more explanation, the Justice Department is trying to have its 
cake and eat it too in trying to change policy without actually restricting executive 
power.” 
- Josh Blackman, Professor of Law 
 
On February 13, 2018, Trump tweeted that “Negotiations on DACA have begun. 
Republicans want to make a deal and Democrats say they want to make a deal. Wouldn’t 
it be great if we could finally, after so many years, solve the DACA puzzle. This will be 
our last chance, there will never be another opportunity! March 5th.”190  Although this 
move appeared to be a positive step towards the dismantling of an executive action that 
involved non-enforcement of the INA, the Trump administration lacked thoroughness 
when it came to explaining why DACA was unconstitutional and defining why a decision 
to rescind DACA should stand. The Trump administration made claims that only began 
to scratch the surface of the DACA program’s constitutionality. In the memorandum to 
Secretary Elaine Duke, for example, Jeff Sessions argues that “such an open-ended 
circumvention of immigration laws was an unconstitutional exercise of authority by the 
Executive Branch,”191 however he fails to explain how and with what regard DACA is 
unconstitutional. Further, Secessions wrongfully appeals to litigation risk as a motivation 
for his decision to rescind DACA; he argues that since “the DACA policy has the same 
legal and constitutional defects that the courts recognized as to DAPA, it is likely that 
potentially imminent litigation would yield similar results with respect to DACA.”192 
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More importantly, the administration has failed to withdraw the 2014 Office of Legal 
Counsel opinion contending that DACA is lawful. And thus, I concur with the court that 
the explanation for rescinding DACA in this memorandum was an insufficient and 
unsubstantiated reference to its constitutionality. 
Where the Trump administration's claims currently stand, it would be hard to 
label them anything less than “arbitrary and capricious.” However if the Trump 
administration is serious about terminating DACA, it needs to bring forward substantive 
constitutional arguments before the Court. Professor Josh Blackman states that the Trump 
administration should view Judge Bate’s decision as a blessing since the decision 
“actually gives Trump a chance to clean it up and issue a new memo that will stand up on 
appeal.”193 Professor Blackman recommend that Attorney General Jeff Session 
“withdraw the 2014 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinion contending that DACA is 
lawful and explain why the policy runs afoul of the “take care” clause as well as the 
nondelegation doctrine.”194 The unwillingness of the Trump administration to fully 
challenge the constitutionality of DACA appeared to be a move by the administration to 
rid itself of unfavorable policy without actually committing to restricting executive 
power.  
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Part 4: Afterthoughts and Recommendations 
4.1: Concluding Statements 
Congress was constructed and envisioned by the Framers to be the most important 
branch of government; it is not by coincidence that the Constitution begins with 
Congress. The legislative branch was purpose-built to be the “foundation stone upon 
which the rest of the governmental edifice would be constructed”195 Congress possesses 
limited and enumerated powers of law making, the process of which was purposely made 
slow to reinforce “the cool and deliberate sense of the community.”196 However, 
presidency after presidency we continue to see Congress became ever more ineffective, 
while simultaneously the executive continues to overreach and expand its power. This 
executive overreach on the legislative branch, however, has occurred with the complicity 
of Congress itself, who have become ineffective due to the heightened polarization and 
fear of accountability.197 The creeping expansion of executive power is troubling because 
it leads to a disbalance in the constitutional system; it creates incentives for Presidents to 
bypass Congress and further expands both presidential power and the public’s 
expectation of it.  
Article II Section 3 of the US Constitution represents a storied history of 
America’s apprehensiveness against the overextension and abuse of executive authority 
that can be traced back to the English monarchy. Much like their English counterparts, 
the colonists worried about an executive who was above the law and possessed the power 
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of suspension and dispensation. Although the US Constitution does not explicitly ban the 
President from suspending and dispensing of the law, there is a general consensus among 
the Framers that the President would not hold such power. This is exemplified by the 
Take-Care Clause, which is recognized as a guard against suspension and dispensation of 
Congressional Acts by requiring the President to execute all constitutionally valid Acts of 
Congress in all situations and cases. The Take-Care Clause places a limit on the 
discretion of the President, and protects against presidential inaction or overreach; outside 
of congressional decisions or the delegation of lawmaking power, the President bears a 
responsibility to execute the law and is deprived of the ability to make it.198  
However, there continue to be deliberate decisions taken by Presidents either to 
not enforce or selectively under-enforce laws to further a political agenda. Both the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) and the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) are 
examples of Congressional Acts that were subject to categorical nonenforcement. In both 
cases, the executive justified their selective nonenforcement as prosecutorial discretion 
due to a lack of resources. With regard to the enforcement of the CSA, it appears highly 
possible that the Trump administration will continue down the path laid by the Obama 
administration, exempting states that have legalized marijuana from it. The enforcement 
of the INA, however is a bit more complicated; the Trump administration has made steps 
to terminate DACA, but has failed to provide an adequate constitutional argument against 
the Obama program. Thus, as it currently stands, both the INA and the CSA regrettably 
continue down a path of executive nonenforcement. 
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Executive categorical nonenforcement stands in direct violation of the US 
Constitution: not only does it violate the congressional primacy in lawmaking, but it also 
violates the Take-Care Clause. Allowing the President to hold such power would place 
him above the law, not under it. Executive categorical nonenforcement does not equate to 
prosecutorial discretion, and acts beyond the scope of executive authority. As Justice 
Brandeis writes: 
“Obviously the President cannot secure full execution of the laws, if Congress 
denies to him adequate means of doing so. Full execution may be defeated 
because Congress declines to create offices indispensable for that purpose. Or, 
because Congress, having created the office, declines to make the indispensable 
appropriation. Or, because Congress, having both created the office and made 
the appropriation, prevents, by restrictions which it imposes, the appointment of 
officials who in quality and character are indispensable to the efficient execution 
of the law. If, in any such way, adequate means are denied to the President, the 
fault will lie with Congress. The President performs his full constitutional duty, if, 
with the means and instruments provided by Congress and within the limitations 
prescribed by it, he uses his best endeavors to secure the faithful execution of the 
laws enacted.”199 
By drastically loosening the scrutiny we give a President's claim to prosecutorial 
discretion, we have transformed the executive into a king-like figure. Let us never forget 
that the role envisioned for the executive was to execute the law, not to mend or create 
the law to further their own political agenda. If Congress passes a law that directs a 
certain kind of enforcement action, the President must execute that action to the best of 
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their ability: this is a fundamental basis of our entire governmental structure.200 It is not 
the president's role to fix unfavorable legislation. We must hold Congress accountable for 
unfavorable policies and restore Congress’s role as an effective check on the President. 
With every free pass we grant a President to not execute the law, we create the very thing 
the Framers warned about; an unrestrained executive who is above the law. Thus, it is 
crucial to our democracy to act upon and argue against this categorical nonenforcement 
of the rules of law, lest we find our government inching closer to its roots in monarchy 
with each change in leadership.   
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